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ABSTRACT 
The idea of inclusivity is everywhere. From myriad sources and encompassing a range of more or less 
broadly understood definitions the concept of inclusivity and its general, implicit ideology that in some 
sense people are better understood by abstract ideas of ‘sameness’ than particular and material 
conditions and experiences, and consequently that boundaries, whether definitional, logical, social, 
or spatial, are things to be ignored, transgressed, or even abolished, is an increasingly pervasive part 
of social life. In this paper, I question the logic underpinning the concept of ‘inclusivity’, and suggest 
that it is a bad concept of which we ought to be wary. Drawing on Adorno’s negative dialectics (1973), 
I suggest that inclusivity, far from being a complement to diversity – with which it is frequently paired 
– can be seen as its opposite; and that the uncritical acceptance of inclusivity as a social desideratum 
not only lacks coherence, but can be read as a particularly insidious form of universalization, through 
which significant material and social inequalities can be rendered invisible, marginalized, or ignored. 
This paper invites a discussion on the importance of recognizing the value of particularity; on when 
(and where) boundaries may be sensible, valuable, and desirable, and how research and practice 
should resist the pressures of universalization. 
 




This paper is something of a thought-piece. An attempt to give some kind of shape to some ideas 
which have been building gradually for a while from a number of different directions and in connection 
to different pieces of research, which seem to share a common thread, but have only recently started 
to coalesce into anything like a general thesis. 
There are perhaps some people in the audience expecting me to say something terribly unorthodox, 
seditious, perhaps even blasphemous, or at least fairly outrageous in this paper. Despite the 
somewhat deliberately provocative title, however, I don’t intend to say anything particular outrageous 
here – that is to say, I don’t believe that anything I have to say here is especially outrageous. This paper 
is not a polemic; I am not embarking on a sustained attack on a particular flavour of liberal values, nor 
am I taking a swipe at any particular organizations, social groups, or individuals for whom the concept 
of inclusivity is held particularly dearly. This paper is intended to stimulate conversation and debate, 
and perhaps as a reminder of the old sceptical adage to question everything. 
At its core, the argument I make here is about concepts and conceptualization. Specifically, it is about 
the relationship between concepts and the entities – material, cultural, psychological, or otherwise – 
to which they relate. Because parts of the argument I’m making here apply on a rather general level 
I’m going to refer to these entities as phenomena, but for the most part this could easily taken to 
mean people, and my conclusions refer especially to situations in which this is the case. 
Arguments about the relationship between words and the world they seek to describe is of a certain, 
and rather well-trodden, philosophical nature; but they are by no means merely an issue over 
semantics or a language game. It is something with very real, material, and everyday implications that 
ought to be taken seriously. However, that is absolutely not to say that concepts and phenomena are 
simply the same thing. Rather, the two spheres exist in a changing, contentious relation with one 
another. 
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The theme of this conference, of course, is boundaries, and what I have to say here is concerned with 
boundaries of two closely related kinds: firstly, the boundaries between words and objects – between 
concepts and phenomena; and secondly, the boundaries between different objects or phenomena, or 
collections or assemblages of objects or phenomena, or the experiences associated with different 
objects or assemblages of phenomena. 
I want to suggest here that the concept of ‘inclusivity’ is problematic in regards to both of these types 
of boundaries. Specifically, it fails to adequately contend with the first (the boundaries between 
concept and phenomena): which is to say, it fails as a concept – as a signifier - to relate meaningfully 
to the phenomena, or the experiential reality, it purportedly signifies; and, this failure is because it 
also fails to acknowledge the important reality of the second. Actually, my overall argument is that 
the concept and practice of ‘inclusivity’ is in itself an attempt to deny that reality through 
universalization. 
I’ll start with the first sort of boundaries – between concepts and phenomena. 
 
THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN CONCEPTS AND PHENOMENA 
There are many concepts – both in the technical lexicon of science and philosophy and in everyday 
discourses – that give rise to enormous debate over definition, application, and value. These are not 
reserved for technical or academic concepts, but are an intrinsic part of the linguistic and conceptual 
apparatus through which we make sense of our everyday lives. In fact, manoeuvring the troublesome 
terrain of contested and often ambiguous concepts and their consequences is an unavoidable 
everyday reality. One need only consider any collection of everyday concepts such as ‘love’, ‘truth’, 
‘home’, ‘Brexit’, to appreciate the weight and complexity of the words we use and their (often 
multiple, contextual, and profound) meanings. The problems with these conceptualisations (indeed, 
Against Inclusivity  Matthew J. Durey 
4 
 
all conceptualisations) lies in the fact that they are so very important – necessary, in fact – in making 
sense of the world, and at the same time so very difficult to be precise about. 
 
ADORNO, CONCEPTS, AND THE PARTICULAR 
In his Negative Dialectics, Adorno argued that philosophy had failed to provide solutions to humanity’s 
problems because it (and society in general) had largely forgotten the distinction between concepts 
and phenomena, and had been treating our abstract concepts as if they in fact were reality itself. 
Adorno argued that the concept is never sufficient in describing the particular object or class of 
phenomena to which it relates, and likewise no particular phenomenon fully defines the concept. The 
concept of ‘chair’, for example, can never describes all the physical, material, social, cultural, symbolic, 
or emotional attributes of every chair, nor could any individual chair ever embody the entirety of what 
is meant by the concept of ‘chair’. 
This does not mean that we must attempt to live in a world of infinite multitudes. Adorno is clear that 
the use of concepts is inevitable, we must develop conceptual systems and categories in order to 
render the world meaningful to any degree, but these concepts and categories exist only as our ideas 
or impressions of the particular phenomena which they seek to represent, they can never be equal to 
one another. In Adorno’s language, there is no identity between the object and its concept, and every 
attempt at conceptual categorization inevitably fails to capture part of the particular. There are always 
things left behind: ‘objects do not go into their concepts,’ Adorno argues, ‘without leaving a 
remainder’; something which the concept fails to capture, and which is consequently erased, lost. 
What is lost, ultimately for Adorno, is the very idea of difference itself. 
Concepts do not stand alone, but are always part of conceptual systems. At one level this is simply 
because they are part of a language, which permeates our everyday abilities to understand the world, 
but also because they relate to each other as parts of varying discourses, which implicitly, or perhaps 
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explicitly, seek to define, influence, and shape the world in various ways. Consequently, Adorno 
maintained that all concepts, all conceptualizations – indeed all thinking – carried the inherent risk of 
totalitarianism. Because concepts seek to erase the differences between and within the phenomena 
to which they relate, they lead not simply to inaccurate or bad understandings of the world, but 
actively work to enforce an entirely artificial sameness upon the phenomena and experiences they 
totalize. In other words, they destroy the ‘crucial differences’ that make up the material world of 
phenomena. 
This boundary between the sphere of concepts and that of the phenomena to which they relate is not 
simply a philosophical concern, but has significant implications for people’s everyday lives, and the 
concept of ‘inclusivity’ provides a particularly apposite example of the failure to recognize this crucial 
distinction. 
 
INCLUSIVITY AND DIVERSITY 
An important aspect of any concept is how well it describes, represents, or corresponds with, and 
therefore enables us to understand or make sense of, the phenomenon or phenomena to which it 
relates. The history of empiricist philosophy and scientific inquiry has been concerned with 
establishing the basis on which concepts, or claims to describe or explain material phenomena can be 
considered successful, and this has largely come down to relying on concepts or ideas which are 
capable of making meaningful, and particular, statements or predictions about reality that can 
withstand empirical scrutiny. And it is here that we should first start to be critical of the value of 
‘inclusivity’. 
The idea of ‘inclusivity’ of course comes in many forms and with various definitions, and I’m not going 
to dig around in this; instead, I want to draw a parallel between the idea of ‘inclusivity’ and the concept 
of diversity, with which it is frequently associated. 
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Diversity, according to the University of Sunderland’s equality and diversity staff training module, is 
concerned with ‘understanding that people are different,’ with ‘valuing those differences,’ and people 
being ‘treated fairly according to their needs’. The emphasis here is on the characteristics of people – 
the all-important particularities and differences which shape our lives. Diversity, therefore, relates to 
material reality, it is fundamentally concerned with and anchored to the actual, material, objective 
conditions of the world within which people’s lives are formed and carried out. 
Compare this with a typical example of a definition of inclusivity (taken from the website of an 
occupational therapy company). Inclusivity ‘is seen as a universal human right. The aim ... is to 
embrace all people irrespective of race, gender, disability, medical or other need. It is about giving 
equal access and opportunities and getting rid of discrimination and intolerance’. 
There are lots of things to pick at with this definition, but I’m concerned here with one issue in 
particular. Whereas the concept of diversity is both particular and empirical, and relates to the 
material world and our experiences of it, according to this (entirely typical) definition, ‘inclusivity’ is 
neither. The idea of ‘inclusivity’ is universal and abstract. It merely asserts – that those diverse 
phenomena, those different people and experiences, ought to be grouped together ‘irrespective of’ 
the differences between them, and treated the same according to a universal principle that does not 
necessarily relate to – and actually implicitly denies – their particular experiences. Moreover, it asserts 
the normative implication that those differences must be relegated to the background in order that 
everyone can be understood and treated the same, united under a single abstract explanatory 
concept. Effectively, that diversity must give way to ‘inclusivity’. 
The boundaries between concepts and phenomena mean that all concepts fail to adequately 
encompass their object. Moreover, as Adorno warned, all concepts, by virtue of their character as 
concepts, are potentially totalitarian – losing, denying, or erasing those differences which escape their 
definition. The concept of ‘inclusivity’ is particularly vulnerable to this criticism because the nature of 
its conceptual content argues for universal inclusion – rather than acknowledging the differences – 
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the particularity – of the world, it asserts, without recognizing material difference, that we can, or 
indeed should all be, or be treated, the same. 
And this brings us to the second type of boundary – those between different phenomena. 
 
BOUNDARIES BETWEEN DIFFERENT PHENOMENA 
At its simplest, conceptualization is categorization – an attempt to establish a meaningful category of 
phenomena in order to make the world intelligible. But the particularity of phenomena, and the 
inability of our concepts ever to fully describe it mean that our categories are always flawed. The 
broader the category, the farther we cast our conceptual net, the more heterogeneity it inevitably 
contains, and thus denies. When those phenomena are people and their experiences, the denial of 
difference becomes especially problematic. ‘Inclusivity’, as we just saw, is seen as ‘a universal human 
right’, implying a single category of humans who can be included together. The universal category of 
‘human’, which is the basis of the UNDHR, highlights aspects by which we are all the same but tells us 
virtually nothing about any individual human. It tells us nothing, for instance, about life expectancy, 
susceptibility to disease, or the requirement of specific medical or social interventions or provisions, 
or likelihood of involvement in armed conflict, enslavement, or sex-trafficking, etc. which are all 
contingent upon and inseparable from myriad and complex issues of social geography and political 
economy as well as biological and psychological variation. All of which are readily ascertainable 
through empirical research which pays attention to differences in, and disaggregates data according 
to empirical and material factors including, for instance, geography, sex, ethnicity, and socio-economic 
class. All the ways in which we are the same – the merely human – are, for many but certainly not all 
people, in actuality, very small parts of their everyday experiences. Of course, this does not mean that 
they are not important or relevant; but nevertheless, for a significant proportion of people living on 
the planet, our lives are defined far more by what separates and distinguishes us than by those things 
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which unite us – the merely human. The fact that for so many people basic human subsistence and 
safety is an everyday concern while many others can spend their days concerned with the implications 
of concepts like ‘inclusivity’ should in itself be ample proof of the limits of its traction as a useful 
concept. 
The specific factors facing, for example, Black women in the United States of America, victim/survivors 
of domestic violence and abuse in same-sex relationships, youth deviance in Sao Paulo, etc. cannot be 
adequately addressed simply by ‘including’ these disparate and particular people and groups under 
broader categories. Nor should we assume these groups are themselves internally homogeneous. 
Instead, there are differences – boundaries – between groups of phenomena, and particularly people, 
which are real or meaningful, although certainly not necessarily positive (or negative). 
As I have already mentioned, inclusion within a concept or category is not just a linguistic or 
philosophical issue: it potentially has significant material implications where category membership 
forms the basis of behaviour, or is a requisite for access to places, practices, or experiences. The logic 
of inclusivity implies that it is always positive to be ‘included’ – and therefore negative to be ‘excluded’ 
– but this is too simplistic a picture, and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that grouping diverse 
populations together, particularly for ‘inclusion’ within general or mainstream services or institutions 
does not promote integration or equality, but can, for some, further entrench inequalities. 
Inclusive education, of course, sought to remove the social disadvantages experienced by disabled 
children and those with special educational needs by ‘mainstreaming’ their education, believing 
barriers to learning were largely, if not entirely, a question of social definition and being ‘excluded’. 
While for many this was advantageous, for others it meant denying the physical, psychological, 
neurological, and cultural underpinnings of learning difficulties and disabilities – to eradicate the 
differences – the particularities – that were, and are, so central to people’s lives. That mainstream 
schools often lacked the expertise, the resources, and the capacity to provide the services many 
disabled children required in order to fulfil their potential was – at least on an ideological level – a 
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secondary concern, as inclusion in mainstream education was seen to be better axiomatically, and 
therefore inevitably preferable for children with diverse needs, many of whom were happy and 
thriving in environments which, although different, were none the worse for it. 
A similar point can be made in regards to the closure of separate hospital facilities for mental health. 
The old ‘asylums’, while not beyond reproach, were in many ways better suited to providing for their 
patients than the wards in general hospitals that replaced them, precisely because they were not 
general, but particular, specific services. Affording mental health care the same respect as physical 
health care should have meant respecting their differences as much as acknowledging their 
similarities, and recognizing that the effective treatment of borderline personality disorder or PTSD 
does not demand the same facilities and approaches as the treatment of a pulmonary embolism or a 
broken leg. 
It follows then that attitudes which seek to promote equality and ‘inclusion’ can often have the 
opposite effect. The argument that racism is defeated by ‘not seeing colour’ makes a clear example. 
The ‘Black Lives Matter’ campaign which sought to draw attention to the fatal shootings of young 
black men in the US by police officers, was almost immediately subject to an attempt to erase the very 
actual, material, and particular experiences of Black people via the monstrously insulting slogan of ‘All 
Lives Matter’, which effectively denied Black people’s particular experiences by including them with 
the general experiences of all people – including, naturally, those people whose lives do not face the 
same existential threats whenever they leave their homes. 
Acting on the principles of ‘sameness’ carries a number of major risks, which, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
tend to be more dangerous for already disadvantaged groups. Pharmaceutical companies commit to 
market medications often trialled on incredibly narrow populations – and often, ironically, entirely 
healthy people – exposing people with countless very real genetic, bio-chemical, neurological, 
behavioural, geographical, and social differences to an unknown range of potential side-effects, or at 
the very least treatments of unverified efficacy. A recent study by Caroline Criado Perez has drawn 
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particular attention to this and a host of other inequalities experienced by women as a result of the 
‘default male’ model of testing.  
Perhaps worse still, services which aim to help some of the most disadvantaged and vulnerable 
members of society are increasingly pressured in operating on a model of ‘sameness’. Domestic 
violence services, which have suffered tremendously under austerity, have been forced to retreat back 
into the provision of core services – prioritizing ‘general’ provision at the expense of specialist, 
particular services, which are in as much demand as ever, and government funding for such 
organizations increasingly becoming conditional on achieving ‘value for money’ by demonstrating the 
wide – indeed, universal – appeal of their services. 
None of this should be taken to suggest that no good has come from programmes to address 
inequalities – of course, there has been much achieved – but rather to stand as a reminder that the 
categories we employ, if they are to mean anything at all, must acknowledge and relate to the 
particular and material differences that underpin experience. And crucially, that reality does not neatly 
fit into our concepts, but is complex, conflicted and contradictory, and it is entirely possible that in our 
eagerness to progress, we become blind to the implications of forcing our concepts onto contradictory 
experiential reality – particularly when those concepts, like ‘inclusivity’, insist on a universal account 
of the world. 
 
CONCLUSION: UNIVERSALIZATION, AND WHY IT SHOULD BE RESISTED 
Adorno quite famously remarked that ‘to write poetry after Auschwitz’ was ‘barbaric’. The horror of 
the material reality of totalizing worldviews, which had led to so many people and their particular lived 
experiences – material, flesh and blood reality – being treated according to universal, abstract 
conceptualizations, had rendered the idea of thinking about life in purely aesthetic or abstract terms 
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unconscionable. It was only by acknowledging and engaging with the actual, and particular, lived 
experiences of everyday life, that human endeavour could progress successfully. 
I’ve spoken about two kinds of boundaries that, like it or not, are inescapable aspects of our lives: the 
boundaries between concepts and phenomena, and those between materially and experientially 
different phenomena. I’ve argued that these boundaries raise significant obstacles for the idea of 
‘inclusivity’, which fails to appreciate the importance of one, and denies the reality of the other. In so 
doing, it promotes an agenda of universalization, based not in the material particularity of reality, but 
merely in the abstract sphere of conceptuality. It quite inexorably seeks to deny and restrict the 
particularity, the diversity, the differences, which are so crucial in generating and shaping the everyday 
lived experiences of our lives, within a single, totalizing image of the world. In consequence, it 
inevitably seeks to ignore, to deny, or to erase those differences which are so important and 
meaningful, not only as sources of very real, material disadvantages and inequalities, but also of the 
variation and diversity which brings richness and wonder to our lives. 
But one size does not fit all, and we risk committing egregious intellectual error, and causing enormous 
harm, if in seeking to be ‘inclusive’ on political or normative grounds we forget that, as Adorno argued, 
‘no object ever goes into its concept without leaving a remainder’, and that material differences are 
not washed away, but often further entrenched by conceptual abstraction. In this way the material 
inequalities faced by so many people in so many ways are made invisible, rendered unimportant (or 
even nonexistent) by abstract conceptual schemes which cannot contend with the inherent diversity 
of the particular. 
I said at the beginning that despite the slightly provocative title, I wasn’t intending to say anything 
outrageous or provocative, so obviously I want to finish by saying something that is just a little bit 
provocative.  
Against Inclusivity  Matthew J. Durey 
12 
 
David Hume, the great Scottish empiricist, bon vivant, and rattler of cages, suggested that when we 
go through libraries we should ask of the books we encounter whether they contain ‘abstract 
reasoning about quantity or number,’ or ‘experiential reasoning about matters of fact and existence,’ 
and those which do neither, Hume concludes, are of no value to us. If a similar logic is applied to 
concepts, we should ask ourselves whether they clarify the relations concerning our ideas of logic, or 
either describe or explain matters of fact concerning material reality. The concept of ‘inclusivity’, I 
argue, does neither of these things. Following Hume then, I suggest that we ‘commit it to the flames, 
for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.’ 
Thank you. 
